As more and more software applications are directly or indirectly accessible from the Internet, the importance of the security of these applications grows steadily. Hence, it is important that university curricula for computer scientists and software engineers include courses on secure software development. Such courses should make students familiar with the programming language technology, runtime support and available API's for security, and they should also teach them how to use these technological means appropriately.
Introduction
Initiatives like Microsoft's Trustworthy Computing Initiative [1] , and the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [2] are clear indications of the increased awareness about the importance of software security. Software engineers and development teams are expected to take security requirements into account. But the engineering of security requirements into large software projects is a complex matter.
2 Teaching software and application security
Overview of the contents of the course
The secure software course is strongly oriented towards developers. As such, there are many typical security related topics that are not covered: firewalls and intrusion detection systems for instance are technologies that are more relevant for a network administrator than for a software developer. Also the internal workings of cryptographic algorithms are not immediately relevant: developers should try to avoid implementing such algorithms and use existing libraries instead.
In this section, a bird's-eye overview of the contents of the course is given. Also a short discussion of the parts that were extended in the course of this project is included.
The contents of the course are as follows:
1. Introduction. The most important information security concepts are introduced. An overview of the large field of information and software security is given, together with a discussion of how the contents of the course must be situated in this large field.
2.
A case study in secure software. An example distributed application is analysed, and extensive examples of possible threats to, and vulnerabilities in this application are given. This is meant to give the course attendants a good idea of what insecure software is, and it also motivates the need for the techniques discussed in the course.
3. Security technologies as building blocks for prevention/detection. Security technologies are reusable algorithms or models that help enforce securityrelated goals. As such they are often the building blocks for the preventive and detective countermeasures that are built into a software system.
• Cryptographic technology. The behaviour of the most important cryptographic algorithms is discussed from a black-box point of view, and it is shown how these basic building blocks can be composed to form cryptographic protocols that can achieve useful security goals. A fair amount of attention is given to software interfaces to cryptographic technology: the typical software engineer will never implement cryptographic algorithms or protocols, but instead will use an existing implementation from a cryptographic library. Hence, being familiar with the typical structure of such libraries is important.
• Access control. Classical access control models are introduced and an indication of how they are implemented in operating systems and application containers is given. The importance of the trend towards declarative access control is discussed.
• Untrusted code security. Many modern applications are extensible at run-time. A media player can be extended with new codecs, a web browser with client-side web components and a web server with server-side web components. Modern application platforms not only provide support for loading of extensions into an application in an easy manner, they also offer a security architecture to do this in a secure way. The inner workings of such security architectures is explained in detail and example implementations are discussed.
4. Development technologies for achieving the required quality level. Implementation errors anywhere in an application (not necessarily in securityrelated code) can lead to vulnerabilities in the final system. An overview of typical kinds of implementation vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows, canonicalization errors and race conditions is given. Such vulnerabilities can be avoided through quality-related countermeasures. These countermeasures more often rely on software development technology (i.e. suitable programming languages, coding guidelines, ...) than on specific security technology.
5. Case study revisited. The covered material is illustrated by means of the case study introduced in the beginning of the course.
6. Relevant research and sources for more information. The important trend of moving responsibility for security issues away from the developer to the programming language designer or to the runtime system supporting the application is sketched. A case for development platforms that enable late and flexible addition of security countermeasures is made, and the importance of current software engineering research to achieve this goal is discussed.
7. Conclusion. The course ends with a summary of the important issues and principles that were covered.
The secure software course was given for the first time in the year 2000. The contents of the course have evolved significantly over the past three years, but seem to be reaching a maturity point: although it is very likely that the contents will evolve further, they will probably evolve at a much slower pace. The course materials (draft lecture notes, slides and project assignments) are available on the secure software website [5] of our department.
Course extensions
At the beginning of this project, the slides, lecture notes, exercise sessions and project assignments were strongly based on the Java platform, at that time the only application development platform that had a comprehensive security architecture. The courseware has been adapted to cover the .NET Framework.
In the part on cryptographic technology, the cryptographic libraries in the Base Class Library are discussed as a good example of a Cryptography Service Provider (CSP) based crypto library. This material is based on LaMacchia's cryptography chapters in [6] . Unfortunately, the SSCLI does not include the cryptographic framework. To allow for crypto-based projects on the SSCLI (for instance, the PAM.NET project described further on), a port of the cryptographic libraries of the Mono project [7] to the SSCLI was done.
For the section on access control, the .NET CLR is a particularly interesting case study, as support for declarative user-based access control is provided in two ways:
• PrincipalPermission attributes implement user-based access control using the fact that the JIT compiler will insert calls to Demand() for security attributes,
• and also a bridge to declarative COM+-based access control is implemented.
A comparison between these two mechanisms was made in the course of this project and was presented at the ECOOP Workshop on .NET: The programmer's perspective ( [8] ). The lecture notes that describe stack inspection based architectures have been completely rewritten to cover both the Java and .NET security architectures for untrusted code. These lecture notes will be published in the proceedings of the biannual international course on the State of the Art and Evolution of Computer Security and Industrial Cryptography [9] .
Finally, exercises and project assignments based on .NET and the SSCLI were worked out. Some of these will be discussed in the next section.
Exercises and projects based on the CLR and the SSCLI
Depending on the format in which the course is given, students may be required to do implementation projects or take exercise sessions. Also, students can do their master thesis on an advanced software security topic. In this section we discuss some of the exercise and project assignments that were developed. We distinguish three "levels".
1. Simple exercises are assignments that students solve individually or in a classroom context in a limited amount of time, typically less than two hours.
2. Implementation projects can be done individually or in a team of up to 4 students, and typically take between 20 and 40 hours of each student.
3. Advanced projects are done in the context of a master thesis, either by a single student or a team of two students. These projects can take several hundreds man hours of work.
For each of the three levels, we discuss a number of projects, but we focus more on the latter two kinds, since they are more interesting.
Simple exercises
Simple exercises include things such as small-scale implementation assignments using the security API's, or studying small pieces of the SSCLI source.
Implementation projects
In this section, we discuss two implementation project assignments in some detail, and then briefly mention some of the other assignments.
Pluggable authentication for the CLR and SSCLI
The project assignment It has been recognized for a long time that authentication technology can be encapsulated in such a way that new authentication mechanisms can easily be plugged under a generic authentication API. Unixbased operating systems typically use the Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) API [10] to encapsulate authentication. The Java platform uses a similar API as a part of the Java Authentication and Authorization Services (JAAS) [11] . The Windows NT/2000/XP operating systems encapsulate network authentication mechanisms under the Security Service Provider Interface (SSPI) [12] and interactive authentication mechanisms can be replaced by replacing the GINA dll [12] .
The .NET Framework integrates well with the underlying Windows authentication infrastructure, and hence the need for pluggable authentication is less stringent. The framework does contain the necessary hooks to do authentication independent of the operating system (e.g. the GenericPrincipal class) and ASP.NET uses these hooks to support OS independent authentication. However, no authentication framework in which new mechanisms can be plugged in easily is provided 1 : a developer must implement the entire authentication system. This has some drawbacks:
• Implementing authentication logic is extremely error-prone.
• Hard coded authentication logic makes it hard or impossible for a system administrator to change the authentication system, e.g. to implement single sign-on.
Hence, in this project, an extensible authentication framework will be developed. For the SSCLI such an extensible framework is particularly worthwhile, since the SSCLI cannot rely on Windows authentication. Even for the commercial CLR, the framework is useful since relying on Windows authentication has some disadvantages, for instance the roles of the WindowsPrincipal are the Windows groups to which the user belongs. As a consequence, application specific roles will have to be added to the Windows operating system, with the risk of name clashes with roles of other applications on the same machine.
The goal of this implementation project is to design and implement a framework for pluggable authentication modules along the lines of PAM. This framework should run both on the commercial CLR and on the SSCLI.
The authentication framework should be well integrated with .NET's rolebased access control using PrincipalPermission attributes, and the selection of what authentication modules an application should use must be administratorconfigurable. An example module that implements password-based authentication must also be implemented.
Discussion
This project teaches students a number of important things: they get familiar with some of the security API's in the Base Class Library, they gain a good understanding of authentication technologies, they build a real-life secure assembly, and learn to appreciate the value of administrator-configurable security.
An example solution for this project assignment has been fully implemented and documented by Bert Lagaisse. His framework is named PAM.NET, and is described in [13] . Apart from being a very nice educational project, an authentication framework seems to fill a void in the current .NET Framework, as some of our industrial partners have already shown interest in PAM.NET.
Code identity-based access control and user-based access control
The project assignment Code identity-based access control is implemented in the .NET Framework under the name Code Access Security. The Code Access Security system uses two kinds of permissions. The first kind are a direct reflection of evidence about the code (e.g. the StrongNameIdentityPermission) while the other kind are a reflection of resource access (e.g. the FileIOPermission).
One of the things that makes the Code Access Security system work is the assumption that all code in the Base Class Library that exposes a resource performs a call (either imperatively or declaratively) to a Demand() for the appropriate permission. For the resource protecting permission types, it would make sense to extend the permission check to also take into account the identity or the roles of the user that is performing the access. (Clearly, for the evidencerelated permissions, this does not make sense.)
The commercial CLR does not implement such user-based access control on files, registry and so forth, but relies on the Windows access control system to perform these checks: the CLR is subject to the same Windows access control checks as any other process. Since the SSCLI also runs on operating systems with a less expressive access control model for the file system, it is an interesting extension to the SSCLI to have the Demand() for a resource protecting permission also implement user-based access control.
The goal of this assignment is to extend the Code Access Security system in the SSCLI to include such user-based access control to resources protected by permissions. Your solution should let an administrator set a policy for userbased access control (e.g. in the form of an XML file that assigns permissions to users or roles ), and the Demand() of a resource protecting permission should include a check whether the currently executing principal is authorized according to that policy.
Discussion This project forces students to gain a good insight in the inner workings of the Code Access Security system. They also learn the complementarity between user-based and code identity-based access control. This is an example of a project where access to the SSCLI is essential: parts of the source code of the Code Access Security system must be changed.
Other implementation projects
The implementation project assignments that have been developed fall in two categories: Some of the assignments enhance or change the security support in the CLR or in the SSCLI. These include the two assignments discussed in more detail above. Other example assignments in this category are:
• implementations of other standardized security API's such as the Generic Security Services API [14] for secure communication.
• implementations of providers for the crypto framework or for PAM.NET,
• implementing declarative access control using the mechanism of context bound objects.
Assignments of this first kind sometimes make essential use of the SSCLI. For instance the Code Access Security project discussed above can only be done by modifying the source of the CodeAccessPermission class. Others can be done on the CLR as well. Another kind of implementation project focuses more on the correct use of the security support that is present. These projects are typically done on the commercial CLR. An example is the implementation of a secure distributed chat application where students have to use the cryptography API's or the implementation of an extensible document viewer that accepts plugins to render various kinds of documents, where students have to load extensions dynamically and protect against untrusted extensions.
Advanced projects
Again, we discuss two project assignments in detail.
A web services firewall
The project assignment Web services have been criticized from a security point of view as being just a way to tunnel RPC through a firewall. Current firewalls do not understand SOAP, and hence treat web service invocations as all other HTTP traffic. As a consequence, a network administrator cannot enforce fine grained policies on the firewall on what invocations are, or are not allowed.
The goal of this project is to design and implement an application level firewall that understands SOAP and that can filter incoming and outgoing web service invocations based on criteria that can be set by the firewall administrator.
Discussion This is a relatively open-ended assignment. Students can implement a relatively simple web service proxy that can filter based on method names for instance. Or they can go as far as to design and implement an expressive Domain Specific Language for SOAP firewall administrators to specify constraints on invocations.
A prototype solution for this assignment was implemented by Bart De Ceulaer as a part of his master thesis work. His firewall, SOAPwater.NET, consists of a syntax validator and a semantics validator. The semantics validator is extensible: the firewall administrator can write new rules that are compiled on the fly, and linked to the semantics validator.
Clearly, this project should be solved on the commercial CLR, not on the SSCLI.
Advanced typing information as metadata: strengthening the Common Type System
The project assignment Type systems are an important technology to make a programming language more secure:
• Typing and type safety can help eliminate bugs that can lead to security vulnerabilities. For instance, a type safe language can eliminate memory allocation bugs, and thus prevent vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows.
• Type systems can enforce simple security policies. For instance, they can guarantee that the encapsulation of an abstract data type can not be circumvented.
• Typing can make software easier to read and understand, and as such ease the process of eliminating vulnerabilities by code review. Since code review is one of the most effective ways to enhance the security of software, making code review easier can substantially improve security.
The Common Type System (CTS) is an expressive type system, but in the research literature, many examples of new or extended type systems that can improve security in one of the ways discussed above have been proposed. One particularly interesting example are type systems for safe concurrency.
Many programs developed today run multiple threads of execution. There is extensive support for this in the CLI. However, the CLI adopts a free-threading model where access to shared data is not restricted in any way. Developers have to make sure they call the appropriate synchronization primitives in a correct way. This makes it difficult to write correct multithreaded programs. A common type of bug in a multithreaded program is a data race. This is a condition where multiple threads access the same variable without synchronization, and at least one of the accesses is a write. Data race bugs are hard to detect, because they usually only occur sporadically and there is nothing in the code that reveals their presence.
Type systems [15] have been designed that force the developer to declare a protection mechanism for each field or object, so that data races cannot occur. The protection mechanism for an object can be a mutual exclusion lock (either its own or that of another object), or the fact that the object is thread-local or read-only or that there is a unique pointer to the object.
When data races are prevented using locks, another type of concurrency bug could be introduced, namely deadlocks. Some [15] of the type systems that prevent data races also prevent deadlocks on mutual exclusion locks by forcing the program to acquire the locks in a particular order.
It is clear that the extra information developers must include in their code to satisfy type systems for safe concurrency increases code readability, and therefore security, in the presence of multithreading.
In addition to increasing the assurance one can achieve in trusted code, a type system also increases the security of the system in the presence of untrusted code, if the CIL verifier is extended so as to check the well-typedness of the untrusted code with respect to the extended type system. This might require including extra metadata in the assembly to help verification (in addition to the extra metadata, such as extended method signatures, required for separate compilation).
For example, a type system for safe concurrency could keep malicious code from attempting to pass a partially initialized object to trusted code using a data race, thus potentially creating a check-and-use vulnerability.
The goal of this project is the development of a CTS extension, including the design of the required additional metadata, the typing rules for CIL, and a verifier. The CTS extension must implement the types for safe concurrency described in [15] . In addition, types in the extended type system have to be provided for the core of the Base Class Library.
A possible extension of the project would be to also study the issue of interoperability with and migration of existing code, which would have to be addressed if a CTS extension were to be accepted in industry.
Discussion Types are an essential ingredient of a modern programming language. This project familiarizes students with the formal treatment of type systems, and with the notions of type soundness and safety. The typing metadata can be considered a kind of evidence about the untrusted code, and hence the type checker can be incorporated in the Code Access Security system. Hence, also in this project, students get closely familiar with this system.
In this project assignment, one particular type system has been chosen to be implemented. Many other extended type systems have been proposed in the literature, and hence many variations on this project are possible. It should be emphasized however, that for some of these type systems, incorporating them in the SSCLI is a substantial amount of work. Some examples of other type system extensions that could be considered:
Generic types Microsoft Research has published a prototype extension of the CLI Common Type System with generic types [16] . If this extended CTS were to be adopted into the standard and into the CLI implementation(s), this would significantly enhance the CLR as a platform for secure software. Generic types make code easier to read, understand and review.
Non-null types In the CTS, a value of a reference type is either a reference to an object or the null reference. Null references are used as default initial values of fields and array elements, as well as for representing a "special case", such as the fact that something is absent or not applicable. However, often, the fact that a reference can be the null reference is undesirable. Non-null types [17] allow the developer to explicitly make the distinction between places where null references are meaningful and valid, and places where they are not. This increases code readability and prevents bugs.
Types to control information flow One of the most common software vulnerabilities is the absence of input checking. Passing input from an untrusted source directly to a powerful but unsecured resource is a major security risk.
Types that control information flow [18] prevent untrusted input from influencing trusted output. A developer can transform untrusted data into trusted data only by inserting explicit validity checks in the code, thus enforcing input checking.
Another use of such type systems is preventing disclosure of confidential information. Specifically, a program can be prevented from taking confidential input and sending it on a public output channel. A developer can use confidential input to produce public output only by inserting explicit declassification operations in the code.
Conclusion and Future Work
Application security is a growing concern, and teaching software engineers how to build secure applications is very important, but often overlooked in current computer science curricula. One of the aspects of learning to build secure applications is learning about the security support in modern application development platforms like the .NET Framework.
In this paper, we have discussed the contents of the secure software course at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, and have given examples of interesting project assignments based on the .NET Framework or its shared source implementation.
The lecture notes and slides for the course [5] are in a draft stage, but have been used already to teach parts of the course to industry professionals. They need further fine-tuning based on the feedback of attendants, and will then be integrated into the course for our computer science students in the coming academic year.
A number of project assignments have been worked out in detail. For some of them, an example solution has been implemented by our master thesis students. For others, an example solution still needs to be developed.
The .NET Framework is an excellent platform for teaching secure software development, as it includes state-of-the-art support for secure development, and many aspects of its security architecture are extensible. The fact that source code is available for a substantial part of the framework allows students to gain in-depth insight in the inner workings of the security architecture. Many of the projects have been designed to force students to look closely at the security technologies incorporated in the .NET Framework.
